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AGENT ORANGE: History, Science, and the Politics of Uncertainty. By Edwin 
A. Martini. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2012.
MY LAI: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War. By William Thomas Allison. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2012.
THE ORIENTAL OBSCENE: Violence and Racial Fantasies in the Vietnam 
Era. By Sylvia Shin Huey Chong. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 2012.
 In June 2013, Vietnam War veteran Sam Axelrad traveled from his Hous-
ton, Texas home to Hanoi, Vietnam to find what he and many of his peers call 
“closure.”1 Similar trips by former US military personnel have become common 
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over the last three decades because of veterans like Axelrad, who were the first 
US citizens to visit Vietnam in significant numbers when the socialist republic 
began promoting tourism in the mid-1980s. Although these journeys still arouse 
some controversy in the US (especially among those who claim Vietnam holds 
prisoners of war and refuses to account for America’s missing in action, despite 
no evidence of the former and in contradiction to Vietnam’s record of assistance 
with the latter), they have lost most of their capacity to polarize and they rarely 
surprise. 
 However, Axelrad’s quest for emotional resolution had an unusual physical 
relic at its center. This was a human arm, the skeletal remains of a limb belong-
ing to Nguyen Quang Hung, whom US forces brought to a field hospital in Phu 
Cat, Vietnam, in 1966. At that time, Nguyen was a twenty-six-year-old soldier 
in the North Vietnamese Army, close to dying from infection. Axelrad, then a 
twenty-seven-year-old physician working at the hospital, amputated Nguyen’s 
right arm and helped save his life. After Axelrad finished, medics boiled the 
severed limb down to bones and reassembled them into a souvenir for the doc-
tor. Upon returning to Texas to pursue a career in urology, Axelrad locked the 
keepsake away and did not handle it again until 2011, when he started planning 
his reunion with Nguyen.
 According to an Associated Press story appearing in several publications 
including USA Today, Nguyen and Axelrad enjoyed their time together after a 
nearly fifty-year gap. The latter found some closure; the former was as surprised 
by the return of his arm as he was when US personnel treated him in 1966. 
Nguyen also said he was “proud to have shed blood for my country’s reunifica-
tion. I consider myself very lucky compared with many of my comrades who 
were killed or remain unaccounted for.” His statement brings gravitas to an 
article that could have wound up in “weird news” sections of US newspapers. 
Despite its headline’s awful pun, Mike Ives’s report has a serious tone Nguyen 
underscores with a speech act that does three things unfamiliar to many US 
readers. He affirms Vietnam’s revolution, mourns its human toll, and points to 
lack of closure on the Vietnamese side. 
 As an illustration of dis/embodied remembering, “Humerus Reunion” helps 
introduce this discussion of three recent and important books on the Vietnam 
War. Like Nguyen, authors Edwin A. Martini, Sylvia Shin Huey Chong, and 
William Thomas Allison care about the war’s impact on Vietnamese bodies and 
Vietnam, the country. This contrasts with the memory work of too many US 
citizens, who have learned to recall and resent how the Vietnam War traumatized 
their country and its soldiers, to the exclusion of Vietnam’s people, what they 
endured, and their continuing struggles. By making space for Nguyen’s trauma 
and the victory he helped achieve, Ives’s account suggests different and perhaps 
better possibilities for remembering. An elderly man who fought for a unified, 
self-determined Vietnam is present in experience, perspective, and voice. Read-
ers should acknowledge what Nguyen says and what was done to his body. Yes, 
Axelrad upheld his profession’s ethics by operating on Nguyen in 1966 and 
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did the right thing by returning his arm bones in 2013. But should those bones 
have been his souvenir in the first place? Should Axelrad have waited so long 
to make amends? I hope most readers, regardless of their views on the war, will 
be uncomfortable with the post-surgery actions of Axelrad and his staff. I also 
hope that US citizens, known for revering their military veterans, will follow 
Axelrad’s example and show respect to Nguyen and his peers. 
 Maybe I am asking too much. Even though almost forty years have passed 
since the Vietnam War’s end, the bodies, hearts, and minds of people like Nguyen 
may not matter to most American audiences. These spectators would probably 
prefer a bigger yet lighter story—about the trade partnership between Vietnam 
and the US, a bond where neoliberalism vows to heal old antagonisms (e.g., the 
grand opening of Vietnam’s first McDonalds franchise in early 2014, with the son 
of the country’s prime minister as its manager).2 In this atmosphere, Nguyen’s 
statement may have lost power to challenge, to inflame, and perhaps that is why 
Ives’s editors allowed the quote to stand. Perhaps Nguyen was playing it safe, 
catering to Vietnam’s political leaders by following an ideological script in a 
country whose human rights record is problematic at best. The range of possible, 
often mutually incompatible readings Nguyen’s words generate should not dimin-
ish his agency as a speaking subject, however. American studies conversations 
need to account for the experiences that Nguyen and similar narrators make 
available. 
“Waste doesn’t go away, because there is no real ‘away’ in 
nature. Rather, waste is displaced and relocated; it circulates 
within a social ecology in which those with the privilege to 
flush are able to re-site undesirable byproducts in the bodies, 
landscapes, and neighborhoods of those who are themselves 
marked as undesirable and disposable.” —Marisol Cortez3
 Edwin A. Martini’s research for Agent Orange: History, Science, and the 
Politics of Uncertainty took him to many places, Vietnam foremost among them. 
His priorities did not, however, include the closure Sam Axelrad desired. The 
result is a book that feels like a definitive statement on its topic in some respects. 
In others, Agent Orange is a preliminary effort at identifying and perhaps solv-
ing intellectual puzzles with profound implications for the bodies of people not 
just in Vietnam and the US, but also in South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, 
Thailand, and the Philippines, all of which sent troops to help keep the domino 
of South Vietnam from falling.
 US forces unleashed a spectrum of “rainbow herbicides” in Vietnam and 
other Southeast Asian countries during a ten-year period starting in 1961. In use 
from 1965 to 1971, Agent Orange was the most notorious color of that chemical 
palette. Similar to awareness of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which 
emerged in the war’s late stages and took on momentum after its end, public 
recognition of Agent Orange’s possible links to disease and disability was mostly 
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the product of postwar action and advocacy. Today, the belief that Agent Orange 
caused harm to US veterans is widespread and often expressed with uncritical 
certainty. A historian at Western Michigan University, Martini reminds readers 
that such claims were and still are contested. This is his second major Vietnam 
War study in the University of Massachusetts Press series “Culture, Politics, and 
the Cold War.” The first was 2007’s Invisible Enemies: The American War on 
Vietnam, 1975–2000, a revision of Martini’s doctoral dissertation that examines 
how the US punished Vietnam for achieving its revolution and sought to control 
the war’s cultural damage at home. The books put Martini in the front ranks of 
Vietnam War historians at a relatively early career stage. 
 Impressive as that achievement is, Martini has aspirations to go further. 
His new book contributes to historical literatures on science, technology, and 
environmentalism. He points to David Zierler’s Invention of Ecocide: Agent 
Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about 
the Environment (2011) and similar works as influences. Martini’s text also has 
affinities with Greg Grandin’s Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s 
Forgotten Jungle City (2010) and David Kinkela’s DDT and the American Cen-
tury: Global Health, Environmental Politics, and the Pesticide that Changed the 
World (2013), both of which chronicle US–based efforts at shaping regions of 
the global south and east. 
 Conversely, Martini complains about otherwise notable historical works 
on the Vietnam War by George Herring and Marilyn Young that pay little or 
no attention to Agent Orange (249–250n3). As to authors who do concentrate 
on Agent Orange, Martini faults many of their approaches and points to flawed 
works that fall into two categories. In the first are books that serve military and 
other institutional interests by defending their actions relevant to Agent Orange 
and by dismissing criticism of those actions. Books in the second category are 
“advocacy” sources that put agendas of individuals and groups with Agent
Orange–based grievances ahead of “historical context” (3). For Martini, priori-
tizing that context defines his duty and that of his colleagues. Historians are at 
their best when they try to “contextualize and understand historical problems 
based on the evidence at hand” (15) and embrace the kind of inquiry that eschews 
“closure” (147). 
 His promise to avoid taking sides is admirable, but Martini chooses a dif-
ficult path for himself. Even if Martini has no agenda, he does have positions, 
such as his belief that the US should not have fought the Vietnam War. Martini 
also holds US political leaders and policymakers and their legatees accountable 
for decisions about Agent Orange. However, the historical contextualization and 
understanding Martini achieves raises questions about this accountability. Did 
the use of rainbow herbicides constitute chemical warfare in Southeast Asia? 
Are all or even most of the military personnel who claim Agent Orange dam-
ages truly its victims? Which was the more damaging practice, the spraying of 
Agent Orange or its storage at sites in Vietnam? What about the claims of the 
Vietnamese people, who have always fought the hardest for recognition and 
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whose numbers include many children, some of them orphans with congenital 
disabilities? Martini’s answers to these and other questions will surprise and 
challenge many readers. More than a few will be angry. 
 The evidence Martini uses is not just “at hand”; it is the product of his goals 
and choices. As an especially volatile topic from a war that connotes controversy, 
Agent Orange presents daunting obligations to anyone making decisions about 
evidence sources and their uses. While I am not an expert on Agent Orange 
scholarship, Martini impresses me as someone who performs his tasks responsibly 
and skillfully. Consider Martini’s transparency about why and how he gathered 
information from interviewees such as former military official Alvin L. Young. 
Martini describes Young as a polarizing but unfairly maligned figure who has 
produced invaluable Agent Orange research. Although he takes some of Young’s 
critics seriously, Martini dismisses others for making Young a “monster” (251). 
Since I do not know this work I cannot evaluate Martini’s charges, but his inter-
views with Young and his use of Young’s archives in Agent Orange are superb. 
Future Agent Orange historians who exclude Young may have more to answer 
for than Martini does for defending him.
 Martini’s epistemological principles match the integrity of his research 
methods. His use of the “politics of uncertainty” as a critical tool stands out. 
The concept drives his argument about participants in debates over how Agent 
Orange was used, to what extent it harmed people and their environments, and 
what must take place to achieve justice (if not closure) for those with valid claims 
of grievance. Martini reframes these debates and revises their assumptions. A 
key passage finds Martini objecting to how “all sides” have constructed Agent 
Orange dialogues “within a model that relied on clear distinctions between in-
dividual human bodies and the surrounding environment that had been rendered 
increasingly problematic, if not obsolete, by a world in which humans, chemicals, 
and environments have become largely inseparable” (150). Citing David Zierler, 
Ulrich Beck, Bruno Latour, and Donna Haraway, Martini proposes a new model 
that recognizes local, regional, and global interrelationships and could help 
minimize politicized motives and pressures.
 Martini’s persuasiveness in offering an alternative for actors in Agent Orange 
dramas should impress most readers, but many will resist his skepticism about 
core principles of the anti–Agent Orange case. According to Martini, many US 
veterans who receive or are eligible to receive Agent Orange benefits had little 
or no herbicide exposure. Martini makes that point with an introductory vignette 
about a US veteran who served during the Vietnam era and was awarded com-
pensation even though he spent only a few hours in Saigon’s airport. An equal-
opportunity skeptic, Martini charges Vietnamese officials and advocacy groups 
with overstating numbers of Vietnam’s herbicide casualties. There is no proof, 
Martini insists, “that most of these people are victims of the chemical war” before 
assuring readers that his problem is with those doing the overstating and their po-
litical motives (15). “Neither history nor science can supply the kind of certainty 
to support or reject these claims,” he admits, “but without some demonstrable 
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base of evidence grounded in historical and scientific documentation, the fates 
of victims of Agent Orange, in Vietnam and around the world, are even more 
likely to be driven by the ebbs and flows of politics and the resource flows that 
accompany them” (246). This is a powerful conclusion for a powerful book that 
will reach a predominantly academic audience. Martini will need to find readers 
outside that group to have the most impact and to make the most difference.
 The arguments of The Oriental Obscene: Violence and Racial Fantasies in 
the Vietnam Era begin with the confrontational art on its front cover.4 A repro-
duction of a 2006 mixed-media work by Dinh Q. Lê titled Doi Moi (Napalmed 
Girl), the image is well suited to the book’s exploration of a “set of fantasies 
that reveal the relation between suffering and violation, activity and passivity, 
and victimhood and victory in the politics of the Vietnam War” (10). Doi Moi is 
a seemingly chaotic work in which reds, yellows, whites, and blacks dominate 
and dance. However, these multicolored fragments are actually logos and labels 
from the packages of junk snacks and drinks. Lê has arranged these to re/present 
one of the Vietnam War’s most appalling scenes: photojournalist Huynh Cong 
Ut’s 1972 black and white freeze-frame of a group of refugees fleeing their 
incinerated village in what was then South Vietnam. 
 Shortly before Ut captured the image, which many call “Napalm Girl,” 
South Vietnamese pilots accidentally dropped napalm on the village. The naked 
body of Phan Thi Kim Phuc, then a nine-year-old girl, is not quite in the photo’s 
foreground, but it is central. Napalm’s effects had burned all the clothing from 
Kim Phuc’s body. She is screaming and running down a section of highway, 
her arms and mouth open wide in pain and bewilderment. To her right and left 
are fellow villagers joining Kim Phuc in escape, the language of their bodies 
communicating shock, agony, rage. Ut’s original photo captured this with clarity 
and immediacy that remain undiluted after more than forty years. Motion picture 
photographers were at the scene too, but their footage has had less circulation 
and impact than Ut’s still. 
 Lê is after something different in his revision of the photo. In Doi Moi, 
clarity gives way to confusion, disembodiment replaces physical presence, and 
the vivid colors of the fragments take on the appearance of shrapnel—perhaps 
the detritus of globalization, all but obscuring the forms of Kim Phuc and the 
other refugees. Regarding the work’s title, Doi Moi is not, as one might assume, 
Vietnamese for “napalmed girl.” Rather, Doi Moi are economic reforms that 
Vietnam’s government imposed during the 1980s in a move toward what some 
people in that country call “red capitalism”: the introduction of market economy 
elements while the communist party retains political control.5 As their country 
struggled under the weight of Soviet decline, US sanctions, and grinding poverty, 
Vietnam’s leaders had little choice but to seek alternatives to their nationalized 
command economy. 
 What Francis Fukuyama and like-minded observers hailed as the “end of 
history” has had peculiar consequences for Vietnam. Its history of resisting inva-
sion, exploitation, and colonization, of surviving on its own terms, is the source 
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of great national pride. As the Cold War wound down and the Soviet Union, its 
main benefactor, moved toward collapse, Vietnam moved toward rapprochement 
with the US. Neoliberalism helped bring a US embassy back to Vietnam in 1995 
during President Bill Clinton’s first term. Some Vietnamese have benefited, 
but gaps between their country’s prospering few and disadvantaged many are 
widening. In Doi Moi and many of his other works, Lê suggests that economic 
change has come at the expense of Vietnam’s historical agents, who have been 
demoted in favor of mass marketing, reproduction, and consumption of goods 
filled with empty neoliberal calories.
 Similar to Lê, Chong takes critical interest in the Ut photo. Her analysis of 
the picture is a representative passage in The Oriental Obscene, a book obsessed 
with images and dedicated to breaking new theoretical paths for reading them. An 
American Studies and English professor at the University of Virginia, Chong uses 
a chronological frame encompassing the late 1960s to the mid-1980s to “read the 
optical unconscious of the American imagined community” by surveying scenes 
of embodiment and trauma from television documentaries, Hollywood and Hong 
Kong cinema, photojournalism, and more (8). She also draws from theories of 
psychoanalysis and film to identify and interrogate connections between visual 
cultural texts and discourses of race, nation, and politics. The “violence and racial 
fantasies” noted in the book’s title have everything to do with identities—Asian, 
Asian American, African American, and white.
 Throughout the book, Chong’s command of theory is wide ranging and deft. 
Gilles Deleuze and Jean Laplanche stand out, as shown by Chong’s use of their 
ideas to analyze a mass of texts featuring diverse casts of creators and actors. 
Many of these are Hollywood movies by commercially and critically successful 
directors with transnational careers. To her credit, Chong finds new, provocative 
angles on several widely seen, exhaustively critiqued pictures. She also accounts 
for numerous movies that are less well known and from genres that often are 
taken less seriously. She adds a wonderful touch by reproducing part of the tome 
in “flipbook” image form on the edges of chapter five’s pages, so that readers 
can thumb through them and see “Bruce Lee Fight Again!” (219–33).
 My familiarity with several movies discussed here helped tremendously, as 
did my Vietnam War knowledge. Without these reference points, I would have 
found The Oriental Obscene’s theoretical waters hard to navigate. I came to the 
book with enough knowledge of Deleuze to be a competent reader, but none of 
Laplanche other than his name and his ties to Jacques Lacan. Readers whose 
background in these and other thinkers is stronger than mine will probably find 
The Oriental Obscene even richer than I do. Those who lack such knowledge 
should find Chong an alternately engaging and daunting guide. This is not an 
introductory text for those new to theory, but it could work well as a bracing 
initiation. Like so many advanced multidisciplinary texts that interpret popular 
culture, The Oriental Obscene is a bringing together—or collision—of the plea-
sures of the many and the expertise of a few.
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 Whether or not the book reaches multitudes, those who are ready for The 
Oriental Obscene’s challenges will find its rewards substantial and worth sharing. 
Scholars and teachers who value knowledge of the Vietnam War and its cultural 
significance should know Chong’s work and account for it in their own. As a 
member of that audience, I am most impressed with The Oriental Obscene’s 
first three chapters and their fluency with narrating history through the interplay 
of theories and images. Chapter one zeroes in on the year 1968 as a “primal 
scene” with conflicts between African Americans and whites in its foreground 
(37). Photojournalistic documents of trauma and their implications for Asians 
and Asian Americans dominate chapter two. For chapter three, Chong goes to 
the movies: five major Hollywood productions of the late 1970s, a volatile time 
when the Vietnam War’s aftermath made cinematic depictions of that conflict 
both bankable and risky.6 The Oriental Obscene’s fourth and fifth chapters bring 
martial arts films to the fore. This emphasis helps Chong develop an argument 
about how trauma was displaced from Asian and Asian American bodies onto 
those of Euro-American white male action movie stars such as Chuck Norris, 
who visited an imaginary Vietnam with a vengeance in Missing in Action (Joseph 
Zito, 1984) and Missing in Action 2: The Beginning (Lance Hool, 1985).7
 Their respective bases in Laplanche and Deleuze make Chong’s first two 
chapters most representative of her book’s methods and arguments, and perhaps 
of its strengths and problems. Recognizing the cultural salience of the year 1968 
for the US domestically and transnationally (with Vietnam central to both), 
Chong anchors her analysis of how 1968 is a “primal scene” in the fiction of 
David Morrell, who wrote the novel First Blood (1972) and created the Rambo 
character Sylvester Stallone embodied. Referring to Morrell’s statement about 
how 1968’s turmoil drove him to “bring the Vietnam War home” to America, 
Chong focuses on how Morrell read/recalled that year in a way that made it a 
primal scene (35–36). This Laplanchian concept describes a site of “privileged 
fantasy” that links “historical reality” and the “cultural imaginary” and that is 
characterized by “belatedness” and “afterwardness” (or, nachträglichkeit, the 
term Laplanche and Chong favor) (37). According to Chong, Morrell simply 
or not so simply misremembered many events of 1968 and mixed events from 
other years into his recollection. Along with his version of 1968, the cultural 
and historical settings for Morrell’s act of fathering Rambo made the character 
a figure of triangulation—the product of relationships among black, Asian, and 
white identities. Chong makes her case by moving from Morrell’s reflections 
to media coverage of uprisings in Detroit, to Muhammad Ali’s defiance of the 
military draft, to the Black Panther Party’s affirmation of the National Liberation 
Front, to the Chicago police riots of 1968, and to many more events and agents, 
and back again to Morrell. 
 The chapter maintains chronological coherence and works as historicized 
narrative while fusing theory and method in ways that do not bind Chong to lin-
earity. This is a reading of relationships between and within texts and histories, 
traumas and memories, spectacles and witnesses, documentary and fiction, and 
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racialized and politicized subject positions. I have used First Blood in a course 
on the Vietnam War (along with oral histories in print and video forms, but with 
little attention to the Rambo movies, a deliberate choice of mine). Like Chong, 
I take keen interest in Morrell’s story of why and how he told Rambo’s story. 
Her use of the novel and its introduction (which Morrell added to a later edition 
of First Blood, after the movie series all but eclipsed the novel) as a platform 
for larger analyses is fascinating and persuasive and will help my research and 
teaching. Regardless of whether one wants to go as far with Laplanche as Chong 
does, chapter one’s exploration of nachträglichkeit is more than appropriate to 
Vietnam war inquiry, and is especially relevant to constructions of US veterans’ 
identities. In myriad ways and for better and worse, PTSD and Agent Orange 
have become default reference points in discussions of those identities.
 Chong’s interrogation of Morrell and his misreading of 1968 is strong, but her 
web of relationships connecting First Blood with various historical-cultural texts, 
events, and agents has weaknesses. Positioning herself in dialogue with other 
scholars who have evaluated Morrell’s book and the Rambo phenomenon would 
help, but Chong does little of this. Although she considers audience reactions 
to African American public activism before and after the March on Washington 
with sharp attention to changing perceptions by white television viewers, Chong 
has nothing to say about initial receptions of First Blood or the reasons for and 
implications of its bestseller status. Her scrutiny of Morrell as someone whose 
interpretation of media coverage of 1968’s turmoil had far-reaching cultural 
consequences leads to some of Chong’s best analysis in chapter one. However, a 
corresponding effort to show whether or not Morrell’s reactions resembled, dif-
fered from, or were even relevant to the reactions of larger audiences is lacking. 
Chong can also be problematic when referring to certain historical events. Her 
cursory look at Project 100,000, a program that took shape in the late months 
of John Kennedy’s presidency and was overseen by Robert McNamara during 
the Lyndon Johnson years, is an example. Project 100,000 has been the subject 
of sporadic interest from scholars; in recent years, that interest has grown, lead-
ing to valuable studies. The program’s goals and implementation reveal much 
about roles of race, class, disability, and standardized testing in the US military. 
While it is encouraging that Chong mentions Project 100,000 in her comments 
on Muhammad Ali, she should have given readers more—if not in the main text, 
then at least in her endnotes, which refer to very little of the literature on the 
program (65, 294n85). 
 A pattern of overstatement and generalization also hurts some parts of the 
chapter. Describing early network news video footage of southern civil rights 
demonstrations, Chong states that the bodies of black people exhibit a “complete 
visual passivity . . . before the camera” (56, my emphasis). Later, Chong calls 
public opinion backlashes against black power activists and members of the 
mostly white anti–Vietnam War movement “the same.” The judgment is dubious 
at best. First, readers cannot be sure whether Chong is describing the backlash 
in qualitative or quantitative terms. Second, it is unlikely there could have been 
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backlashes against these groups, unless there is evidence that a critical mass of 
US citizens backed black power and the radical antiwar movement in the first 
place. Third, Chong falls short of fairness (and perhaps facts) when asserting that 
desires to be “saviors” led whites to get involved in the civil rights movement. I 
am sure this was true for some (probably too many) whites, but I need to know 
how Chong knows it was true. Even so, whites with that attitude must have found 
themselves disabused of their sanctimony when training with organizations like 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The need for a critical memory 
of white participation in the African American freedom struggle is vital and the 
same goes for the struggle itself. But sweeping generalizations are no way to 
achieve that goal, especially when they are more cynical than critical.
 With her Deleuzian analysis of three photojournalistic texts known for their 
global reproduction and circulation, their harrowing depictions of war’s violence, 
and their foregrounding of Vietnamese bodies, Chong shifts her focus from 
black-white to Asian/Asian-American-white conflict. This is her occasion for 
introducing the “conjunction [that] epitomizes the oriental obscene” (77). Many 
spectators inside and beyond the US geographic borders will recognize these 
pictures, which exist in still and motion forms, as images that sum up the Vietnam 
War. That recognition crosses many generational, experiential, ideological, and 
educational boundaries. First, there is Eddie Adams’s “Saigon Execution,” in 
which Nguyen Ngoc Loan, onetime South Vietnamese police official and later 
a restaurant owner in Virginia, shoots a still-unnamed National Liberation Front 
prisoner in the head during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Next comes one of many 
photos that Ronald Haeberle took while covering the My Lai massacre, also in 
1968: a heap of entangled civilian corpses, just a few of the villagers US soldiers 
exterminated en masse. Last is “Napalm Girl,” the 1972 image discussed earlier. 
 What could be left to say about this “triptych of iconic images” (77)? Chong 
pushes us to consider that the race of the depicted victims makes the violence in 
the photos visible, and that violence does the same thing for the victims’ race. 
These are not, Chong contends, the “photos that lost the war,” as some observers 
who blame media organizations and individual journalists for the US debacle in 
Vietnam charge. She goes further with an incisive point—no photos of wartime 
violence are inherently antiwar—and rejects the idea that the photos are typical 
visual documentations of the Vietnam War (76). Citing Marita Sturken, Chong 
explains that the “foregrounding of race and violence” in the three images was 
rare (77). This leads into an argument about what the photos do and do not do, 
and about relationships between the photos and their viewers. I will limit my 
discussion to Chong’s observations on “Napalm Girl,” which became the focus 
of “healing” responses that “prematurely and falsely [suture] a historical wound 
that ought to remain open to the larger implications of our culpability in the 
violence of war” (113). 
 Chong does not really defend this point; rather, she illustrates it with refer-
ences to a wide range of other texts and contexts, an approach similar to her 
method in chapter one. Again, the results are mixed. Parallels that Chong finds 
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between the content of “Napalm Girl” and photos of Thich Quang Duc’s ritual 
public suicide in 1963 in Saigon are not adequately explained. Yes, both events 
involved fire and trauma in Vietnam, but their images are separated by nine 
years, by the depiction of a meticulously planned suicide versus the depiction of 
a botched bombing raid’s aftermath, by the victims’ gender and age differences, 
and by more. Chong seems to be on firmer footing when calling attention to how 
Ngo Dinh Nhu (better known as “Madame Nhu” and often as South Vietnam’s 
“Dragon Lady”) responded to the 1963 photo and what General William West-
moreland said about the 1972 image. However, even though their remarks were 
similarly childish and cruel, they are not what these visual texts represent. 
 The bulk of Chong’s case is devoted to showing how four would-be agents—
three of them US veterans who served in Vietnam, and Kim Phuc herself as 
the fourth—interact with the photo. Their relationships to “Napalm Girl” lend 
credence to Deleuze’s “critique of the action-image [that] warns us of the inad-
equacy of action-based narratives to account for these traumatic events” (125). 
These viewers personalize (or try to personalize) the trauma that “Napalm Girl” 
depicts, but their efforts are misguided. Instead, Chong calls for that trauma to 
be historicized and politicized so it will become part of a “more complex story 
about collective responsibility for the dispersed actions of modern warfare” 
(123). Although Chong does not suggest ways of pursuing this goal, and while 
the probability of achieving it does not seem high, it is a worthy alternative. As 
to the problems of “personalizing” the “Napalm Girl” text, I see Kim Phuc’s rela-
tionship with the picture differently and more positively than Chong does. I also 
want to separate it from what the veterans do and say. However, this reservation 
and others do not keep me from recognizing Chong’s case as a formidable one, 
or from valuing her book as a contribution to scholarship on the Vietnam War’s 
visual cultural texts, as a stimulus for American and Asian American studies, 
and as a potentially transformative achievement in critical theory and practice.
“By God, we’ve finally kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and 
for all.” —George H. W. Bush8
“Something called ‘The Vietnam War’ (more accurately, ‘The 
Indochina War’) approaches the state of permanent national 
affliction.” —Robert Jay Lifton9 
 With his declaration of a double victory over Iraq and the foreign policy 
legacies of Vietnam in the waning days of 1991’s Operation Desert Storm, George 
H. W. Bush failed to erase other definitions of “Vietnam syndrome.” For politi-
cal leaders like Bush and Henry Kissinger, who may have been the first to use 
the term, the Vietnam syndrome was about remembering the war in ways that 
would discourage future acts of US militarism. By contrast, counselors work-
ing with US veterans of the Vietnam–US war in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
used “Vietnam syndrome” and then “post-Vietnam syndrome” in reference to 
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symptoms now known as PTSD. To close this essay and introduce its last book, 
I offer a Vietnam syndrome definition that has more in common with the clinical 
than the political version. Bush’s rhetoric tried to make the Vietnam syndrome a 
national disability that needed overcoming, an occasion for rehabilitation through 
new world ordering. 
 On the contrary—America’s Vietnam syndrome is a chronic illness its 
citizens must manage, an enduring condition with pedagogical value. One of 
its major symptoms is refusal to see that the US inflicted trauma and terror on 
the people of Vietnam and Southeast Asia in the name of idealism, of theories 
of dominoes and modernization, of appeals to hearts and minds, and of desires 
for peace with honor. One way to address this symptom and others is to replace 
lack of awareness with recognition of collective responsibility for a war in 
which atrocities were the rule and not the exception—predictable outcomes of 
exceptionalist logics, acts that were shocking but not truly surprising. The My 
Lai massacre of 1968 remains emblematic of such acts, thanks in part to large 
bodies of academic and general literature. These texts are opportunities for readers 
to do work that facilitates American accountability and questions exceptional-
ism. William Thomas Allison understands the importance of such activity and 
encourages it in his brief but thorough and valuable new book. 
 My Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War is the latest entry in the 
“Witness to History” series published by Johns Hopkins University Press. The 
text brings a twentieth-century dimension to a series that has, until now, limited 
its scope to King Philip’s War, Preston Brooks’ cane attack on Charles Sumner, 
the victories of the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Northern Arapaho nations over the 
US Seventh Cavalry at the Little Bighorn River, and similarly pivotal events. The 
editors’ selection of the April 1968 My Lai massacre as a more recent watershed 
serves readers well, as does their choice of Allison. This prolific author is a history 
professor at Georgia Southern University, whose works include Military Justice 
in Vietnam: The Rule of Law in an American War (2006). In My Lai, Allison 
puts his expertise to superb use when detailing post-massacre investigations 
and discoveries, and on the courtrooms where US Army Lieutenant William L. 
Calley, Jr., and others stood accused. Thus, My Lai is a compelling case study 
in more ways than one. 
 The book reaches out primarily but not exclusively to undergraduate audi-
ences who need, or whose teachers want them to have, an introduction to My 
Lai. Allison supplies before-, during-, and after-the-event contexts necessary to 
such a project, but the courts martial hearings interest him most and provide the 
most compelling reading. These are reconstructed in economical, well-paced 
prose that should engage most readers. Allison’s characterization of Calley is 
memorable—he disdains this man who “personified the popular cultural stereo-
type of the incompetent lieutenant in Vietnam,” but he also makes it clear that 
Calley reached a position of authority because of the war’s circumstances, the 
questionable judgments of recruiters and superiors, and the functions of military 
bureaucracy (21–22).
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 Unlike The Oriental Obscene, which also gives attention to My Lai but in a 
starkly different context, Allison’s book breaks no new theoretical ground. Nor 
does Allison complicate and expand the scope of his topic’s inquiry, as Martini 
does in Agent Orange. However, judged according to its own goals and on its 
own terms, My Lai comes close to equaling those books in significance. Allison 
has the potential to reach a wide audience with the message that My Lai still 
matters and must continue to matter. Professionally and personally, sharing that 
message is one of my priorities. If my classroom experience of teaching about 
the Vietnam–US war during the last two decades is typical, I can say that lack of 
knowledge about that conflict is widespread among undergraduates. Fortunately, 
most students are eager to learn about the war, which entails facing up to My 
Lai. Allison’s work will be a resource for me in the future, and not just for its 
subject. He is a careful writer who grounds his narrative in archival research that 
puts court records, contemporary press accounts, and other primary sources to 
deft use. Along with the book’s back matter (a timeline, endnotes, and a strong 
bibliographic essay), these fundamentals make My Lai an effective example for 
students learning the discipline of scholarly inquiry.
 Unfortunately, Allison does not address My Lai’s racialized antecedents 
and implications or find space for Vietnamese voices. To compensate, teachers 
need to combine Allison’s book with other sources, notably the documentary 
film on My Lai that the Public Broadcasting Service produced for its Ameri-
can Experience series in 2010. They should also provide information on how 
some US veterans are working with residents of My Lai and other Vietnamese 
communities to improve local facilities and services. Such pedagogy will help 
students contextualize what they will struggle to fathom—that American troops 
could kill civilians deliberately, sometimes sadistically.
 Students will also learn how other American soldiers—Lawrence Colburn 
and the late Hugh Thompson, whose names should be at least as well known 
as Calley’s—stopped some of the carnage at My Lai, saved Vietnamese lives, 
and brought these war crimes to the attention of an American public that often 
reacted in polarized ways. Some used their outrage as motivation to work for 
peace. Others chose to celebrate Calley’s acts and denounce his critics. Allison 
uses the words of New Orleans resident Hildegard Crochet as the epigraph for 
one of My Lai’s chapters: “He’s been crucified. Lieutenant Calley killed 100 
Communists single-handed. He should get a medal. He should be promoted to 
general” (95). Knowing the spectrum of responses to My Lai is crucial to under-
standing the roles of language and stories in shaping Vietnam War memories. In 
a variety of compelling ways, the books discussed here illustrate the urgency of 
that understanding, providing an invaluable service for generations of readers 
who are coming of age during times of new world ordering and global wars on 
terror. 
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